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2004 年所有 A 股上市公司的股票日收益率数据，本文发现《若干规定》公告事
件窗内，市场整体对事件做正向反应，有 4.15%的累积超常收益；在控制了与市





































The prevalence of large shareholders around the world has become an 
indisputable fact. The controlling shareholder might expropriate the minority 
shareholder and thus cause damages to corporate valuation. Recent years , the "tunnel 
effect", that is, the controlling shareholder benefit themselves at the expense of 
minority shareholders’ interests, has drawed much attention in corporate governance 
literatures. Central agency problem becomes an important corporate governance 
issues. So, there needs some corporate governance mechanism protect minority 
shareholders from expropriation if "insiders". 
This paper aims to study the relationship between minority shareholder 
protection and firm valuation in China. Strong investor protection lead to higher firm 
value (La Porta et al., 2002).To strengthen legal protection of investors is an important 
mechanism to improve corporate governance performance. But there are also contrary 
views that laws and regulations is unnecessary because “contracts” could achieve the 
same result (Easterbrook and Fishel, 1991). On September 26, 2004, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC hereafter) issued “Some Rules on 
Strengthening the Protection of Public Shareholders’ Interests (Draft)” . So, this paper 
will test market reaction by examine how stock price was affected by the 
announcement, to see whether investor protection leads higher firm valuation in 
Chinese capital markets, and whether securities market regulations could be an 
effective substitute for legal protection in countries with weak levels of legal 
protection. 
There’s relative little paper using standard event study methodology to 
investigate the relationship between investor protection and firm value. This paper 
will use event study methodology to analyze how firm values responded to CSRC’s 
issue of a regulation aimed at reducing expropriation from minority shareholders. An 















sample of firms before and after the changes in the regulatory environment. As a 
result, we do not need to control for firm heterogeneity. After examining the stock 
return data of 2003, 2004 tradable-A shares, this study finds that the market portfolio 
has a positive response to the announcement. There are 4.15% cumulative abnormal 
returns. This means on average, investor protection news increase about 4 percent of 
firms’ market value. As for the study of cross-sectional differences in cumulative 
abnormal returns, this paper use a direct indicator-potential harmful related party 
transactions to measure levels of expropriation and finds that during the event window, 
high expropriation firms significantly outperforms relative low expropriation firm. 
The results demonstrate that regulations to protect minority shareholders in 
China can result in increases in the value of minority shares. It provides new evidence 
from China on important issues raised in the “law and finance” literature. It is also 
supporting the theoretical model of La Porta et al. (2002), which predicts that better 
investor protection is rewarded with higher firm valuations. The result is also 
consistent with the theory and evidence of Glaeser, Johnson and Shleifer (2001), who 
compare strategies for investor protection in Poland and the Czech Republic and then 
conclude that regulatory enforcement can effectively substitute for judicial 
enforcement in emerging markets with weak investor protection.  
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2004 年 1 月，国务院发布了纲领性的《关于推进资本市场改革开放和稳定
发展的若干意见》，将发展资本市场提升到国家战略任务的高度，明确指出“要
保护投资者特别是社会公众投资者的合法权益”。作为其具体落实举措之一，
2004 年 9 月 26 日，中国证监会颁布了《关于加强社会公众股股东权益保护的若
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